A New Year’s Resolution for a New U.S./Mexico Strategy

The 2012 presidential elections in both Mexico and the United States present a challenge to the continuity of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation.  A lot is at stake and the outcome of these elections could make or break either country’s ability to fight and defeat drug cartels.

Much of it hinges on the Merida Initiative put in place by Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Regardless of political affiliation, however, the incoming Mexican executive should reform, not abandon, the Merida Initiative security partnership to safeguard current investments and reform processes.

On December 15, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Patricia Espinosa appeared before a committee of senators and expressed her regret that the Merida Initiative – the main framework for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation on organized crime – has experienced sluggish success. Funding discrepancies are partly to blame. Each year Mexico spends $4 billion dollars combatting drug trafficking. In contrast, since the beginning of the Merida Initiative in 2008, the U.S. Congress has only authorized a total of $1.5 billion in equipment and training.

Furthermore, as Secretary Espinosa notes, Mexico has only received $750 million of that – or about half of the amount authorized. While the reaming funds may be pending certain approvals, such as a mandatory human rights report required for further disbursements, U.S. support for the Initiative was reiterated two weeks ago when Congress approved an additional $248.5 million for 2012.

Funding, however, is just part of the equation. A dramatic change in strategy is required if the initiative is to attain the goals it espoused. The United States and Mexico should complement the efforts of the Mexican military with a more nuanced, strategic approach that targets the structural economic underpinning of drug cartels. Given the turbulent political contexts on both sides of the Rio Grande, such a change might be the only way the Merida Initiative will live up to its potential.

In 2006, newly elected President Felipe Calderon had initiated anti-corruption, judicial and law enforcement reforms while deploying the army to dismantle Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). As of December 2010, the confrontation has resulted in more than 34,500 deaths, raising questions about Calderon’s security strategy. Despite economic growth, and the successful neutralization of key drug lords (the most recent instance occurred on December 10), Calderon’s National Action Party (PAN) worries that opposition parties will utilize the rise in violence to discredit the PAN in the 2012 Mexican presidential elections.

In the United States, Mexican DTOs control most of the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine distribution. They use an estimated $25 billion in annual profits both to buy additional shipments of cocaine, and to pay for operating expenses such as bribes and weapons. No conclusive evidence exists that violence in Mexico has crossed into U.S. territory. Nevertheless, the Mexican DTOs dominating the U.S. illicit drug market are considered the country’s greatest organized crime hazard.

As a response to a national security threat, the Beyond Merida initiative has been able to garner bipartisan support. However, this political goodwill will not guarantee indefinite funding, given the domestic pressure on Congress to reduce the deficit. Furthermore, facing presidential elections in 2012, both Republicans and Democrats are likely to prioritize domestic economic issues such as unemployment, rather than international aid. Given these circumstances, policy makers should consider a security strategy increasingly focused on destabilizing the business model employed by DTOs.

To sustain their operations, Mexican DTOs rely both on clandestine bulk cash shipments from the United States, and online transactions that circumvent current financial regulations. To increase bulk shipment interceptions at the border, the U.S. and Mexican governments should cooperate to install superior contraband detection technologies, and increase personnel for vehicle monitoring and tracking at the border. To regulate the electronic transaction methods used by DTOs, both governments should broaden existing electronic money transfer statutes as suggested by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Since 2006, Mexican authorities have seized about 75,000 illegal firearms. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has determined that a majority of those weapons came from straw purchases in Texas, California and Arizona.

While the U.S. government requires that gun stores notify authorities whenever an individual buys more than one handgun within five consecutive business days, no such requirement exists for military-style assault rifles, and even violations of existing laws rarely result in revocation of a sales license.

Congress should extend handgun reporting requirements to higher caliber weapons and institute serious charges for the violation of these laws. Policy makers should reiterate how lax U.S. firearm regulations not only arm violent DOTs and increase the risk of spillover violence, but have also enabled the murder of at least two U.S. federal agents.

The U.S. and Mexican governments’ shared responsibility paradigm for cooperation acknowledges that Mexican DOT profits are generated by narcotics sales within the United States. While U.S. efforts have focused on training Mexican law enforcement, few new investments have been made in reducing the demand for narcotics. The effects of current prevention, treatment, and enforcement policies will not be evident within the next five years. Congress should therefore complement existing long term policies with increased funding for innovative initiatives, such as a promising program in Hawaii that makes probation contingent on random drug tests, which typically result in incarceration if failed.

The investment and the level of cooperation achieved through the Merida Initiative have been too important to abandon in the face of disappointing progress. It is clear that a change in strategy is essential. Perhaps it’s time to begin shifting some of the crosshairs away from the drug lords at the top (who can be replaced), and aim them at the sophisticated economic lifelines at the bottom, which are indispensable for DTOs.

Dante Pérez is an international relations major interested in policy analysis and advocacy, currently living in Washington D.C.

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